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A Constitutional Faith
By ANTHONY LEwis*

In February, 1798, Thomas Jefferson wrote his friend James
Madison that "a great ball" was to be given in Philadelphia on the
twenty-second: Washington's birthday. Jefferson, the man of democratic manners, said this "very indelicate" idea aroused "uneasy
sensations", but he consoled himself with the thought that the birthday
being celebrated was that not "of the President, but of the General."'
Once someone suggested to Jefferson that the nation mark his birthday.
"The only birthday I recognize," he replied, "is that of my country's
liberties. '
We have been engaged in celebrating the two-hundredth anniversary of the birth of our country's liberties. Sometimes it seems a suffocating business, this bicentennial, drained of feeling by repetition and
cheapened by commerce. But it has meaning for us still, if we can
find it. The question is whether we understand what it is we are celebrating. Not temporal power, surely-not the unexampled wealth of
this country. We celebrate a victory of ideas and of principles of
government. Can we identify them? Do we really share a faith with
the extraordinary group of people who created the United States of
America?
It is necessary to recognize, at the start, that we commemorate
much more than the events of July, 1776. There was no United States
then, or even after the Revolution succeeded. There was a collection
of states, acting together with difficulty in war and ineffectually in
peace, under the Articles of Confederation. If the genius of the
founders had run out there, it is hard to imagine what would be said
in a bicentennial speech, or indeed whether there would be any. We
are a nation today because the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 wrote a document beginning, "We the People of the
* Columnist, New York Times and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School.
1. 3 MEMOnR, CORRESPONDENCE AND MrSCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF
ThoMAs JEFFERSON 372-73 (2d ed. T. Randolph ed. 1830).
2. W. CURTIS, TAE TRuE THOMAS JEFFERSON 159 (1901).
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If birthdays are a celebration of survival, as they

tend to become with age, then we really are celebrating what has made
it possible for America to last two centuries in freedom. That is the
Constitution.
The relationship between the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution has been a subject of much dispute in history. Earlier
in this century there was a fashion for debunking the Constitution, for
treating its framers as reactionary conspirators out to preserve their
property.3 The Declaration was seen as a flame of revolutionary
purity, democracy, and egalitarianism, snuffed out in 1787. That
particular historical fashion seems to be passing, perhaps because
recent history makes it hard to maintain the image of the Constitution
as a reactionary device.
The two documents have to be seen as responses to the necessities of two different times. In 1776 the need was to establish
independence and liberty as legitimate ends and to rouse a disparate
people to war against colonial masters. There was no occasion then
to ponder the means of preserving freedom under civil government.
The Declaration, conceived to legitimize revolution, in fact mentioned
only recurring rebellion as a remedy for tyranny. 4 The time to consider
the means of maintaining civil order with liberty came with the Constitution. Lord Acton summed it up well in considering the influence
of American history on France. He said, "What the French took from
the Americans was their theory of revolution, not their theory of
government-their cutting, not their sewing."5
We have exceptional insight into the minds of those who did the
sewing in 1787 because three supporters of the new ConstitutionAlexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay-explained its purposes in a brilliant work of advocacy, The Federalist. If there is one
passage from The Federalistthat best lays out the premises of the American Constitution, it may be Madison's statement in FederalistNo. 51:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls
on government would be necessary. In framing a government
3. See Diamond, The Declarationand the Constitution: Liberty, Democracy, and
PUBLIC INTEREST 39 (Fall 1975), citing especially C. BEARD,

the Founders, 41 THE

AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).

4. "[W]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it
is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it. . . ." DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENcE, para. 2, el. 2.
5. J. ACTON, ESSAYS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 389 (W. McNeill ed.

1967) [hereinafter cited as ACTON].
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which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the govern-

has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
ment; but experience
precautions. 6
The Federalist papers are the more remarkable if one considers
the external realities when they were written. Here was a sprawling
land, much of it untamed, where it took seven days for Virginia to hear
the news that New Hampshire had provided the needed ninth state vote
for ratification of the Constitution. 7 Indians and foreign nations threatened physical danger, and the burden of war debts threatened financial
ruin. It sounds today like the setting for a totalitarian movement. But
in those circumstances Hamilton and Madison and Jay put their faith
in reason. They believed that men were creatures rational enough to
govern themselves. They believed that institutions could overcome the
defects of human nature and keep men in freedom. And perhaps most
amazing to us in these more cynical times, they believed that men could
be persuaded to these views by philosophical argument.
Faith in reason and in institutions is the secret of liberty that the
framers tried to leave us. They recognized, as The Federalist put it,
that republican government was subject to "mortal diseases," namely,
"instability, injustice and confusion."' But they thought there was "a
republican remedy" in "the extent and proper structure" of the new
federal government.9 It was in that structure-in institutions-that
Americans were to find Madison's "auxiliary precautions" for their
liberty.
The idea of writing into the very foundations of a government
protections against future abuses was not new in 1787. The theme can
be found in a document of 1776 that helped to inspire the language
of the Declaration of Independence-the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, in good part the work of Jefferson's great libertarian friend,
George Mason. 10 It was adopted on June 12, 1776 and immediately
published. The Declaration begins with the statement that "all men
are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
rights ... , namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) [hereinafter cited as THE
FEDERALIST].

7. See H. MILLER, GEORGE MASON: GENTLEMAN REvoLUTIONARY 297 (1975).
8. TiE FEDERALISr No. 10, supra note 6, at 51-52 (J. Madison).
9. Id. at 60.
10. R. RurLAND, THE BmTn oF Ta BILL OF RIGHTs 1776-1791, at 33 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as RuTLAN].
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of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."' 1 It is not hard to see there the germ of Jefferson's bold
assertion in the Declaration of Independence that "all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happi12
ness."'
The Virginia Declaration says, too, that a majority of the community has the "unalienable right" to change or abolish a wrongful government.13 But it goes on, as the Continental Congress did not, to list
some means of preventing abuses. It says the "legislative and executive
powers of the. state should be separate and distinct from the judiciary
."'
In language like that of the Sixth Amendment, it says that
those accused of a crime have the right to know the charge, to be confronted by witnesses, and to be tried by a local jury. 15 It adds that
no man should "be deprived of his liberty except by the law of the
land"---language that looks ahead to that mystical phrase, "due
process of law." It condemns excessive bail, 7 general search warrants,' 8 and cruel and unusual punishments.' 9 It calls for freedom of
the press 20 and the free exercise of religion. 2 '
It is easy to understand why the author of the Virginia Declaration
of Rights opposed ratification of the Constitution in 1788-because it
contained no "bill of rights."2 2 George Mason lived to see the adoption
of the first ten amendments, and he was reassured. But I think the
authors of The Federalist were right when they argued-Madison
directly against Mason, in the Virginia ratifying convention-that the
original Constitution contained in the very nature of the government
it created safeguards as important as any in a bill of rights.
What are the "auxiliary precautions" that the Constitution provides
against tyranny? First, there is the pervasive theme that -the federal
government has only limited powers-those granted it by the Constitution. That concept may seem a faded one in an age when so much
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 231, para. 1.
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2, cl. 1.
RuTLAND, supra note 10, at 231, para. 3.

Id.at para. 5.

15. Id. at 232, para. 8.

16. Id.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

para. 9.
para. 10.
para. 9.
para. 12.
233, para. 16.
115-17.
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power is concentrated in Washington. But I think it has affected attitudes in a way that still has significance. In our system, any exercise
of official power has to be founded on some authority. Of course that
theory can be, and has been, bent out of recognition. But the habit
of mind is there, and it matters. A park service officer who posts 23a "
rule about campfires and a president who orders a quarantine of Cuba
both must be ready to cite a legal basis for their actions. That may
not seem like much of a safeguard considering the ingenuity of lawyers,
but we can see that it matters if we compare attitudes in other countries,
even democratic ones. Very often the presumption there is the
opposite: that an official has authority for what he does unless someone
proves the contrary. The attitude carries over, for example, into what
I think is the wider discretion exercised by British officials, high and
low, in their use of power.2 4
Second, and closely related, there is the federal system-the division of power between the states and the federal government. Again,
we know how much more centralized this country has become, but
some values of federalism persist. The existence of independent systems of law, of state governments, of diverse taxes and social legislation
-all this is different from almost any other country on earth. Lord
Acton, who made abuse of power his special study, said federalism was
"the one immortal tribute of America to political science."2 5
Third, there is the separation of powers among the three branches
of the -federal government. We live daily with the conflicts that
resulted from that structure: the congressional struggles for executive information, the presidential threats of veto, the judicial negatives.
These struggles may seem inconvenient, and they would be quite
unthinkable in Britain or France or most other countries. But the
framers intended conflict. The natural tendency of anyone in government to be jealous of his own power, they thought, would produce
resistance when someone else overreached. The purpose, as Justice
Brandeis said, was' "not to promote efficiency but to preclude -the exercise of arbitrary power. . . , not to avoid friction, but, by means of
23. See A. CAYEs, TiM CUBAN MISSME COjsis 285-97 (1974).
24. An indication of the British attitude was the recent judgment of the Lord Chief
Justice that the Crown could invoke judicial power to restrain publication of a late minister's diaries-diaries containing no security matters but assertedly violating cabinet confidences-in the absence of any statute protecting such confidences and indeed in the
teeth of evidence that the cabinet had considered and rejected a proposed rule
to that effect. See Attorney General v. Cape, The Times (London), Oct. 2, 1975,
at 8, col. 1.
25. AcToN, supra note 5, at 393.
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the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental
powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy."2 6
From all of these structural devices-the limited grant of authority, the division between. tho federal government and state governments, the separation of powers-and from the specific guarantees of
individual rights added in the first eight amendments and the fourteenth, there follows one fundamental truth about our Constitution: It
gives us the most legalized system of government on earth. In 1835
de Tocqueville wrote: "There is hardly a political question in the
27
United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one."
Today we look to judges to decide how students may dress in school,
to regulate conditions of life in prisons, and to decide what limits there
may be on campaign contributions and expenditures in national
elections-examples chosen at random and all, I suspect, quite beyond
the business of judges outside the United States.
As the American Constitution has worked in practice, its most
striking contribution to political theory has been the doctrine of judicial
review: the power of courts to hold unconstitutional-unlawful-acts
of Congress, the president, state legislatures, and public officials. We
are so used to the idea that we take it for granted. But it is really
an extraordinary notion that judges should have the last word in a
democracy, overruling the acts of elected representatives and officials.
There was a time, that same debunking period earlier in this century,
when it was said that Chief Justice Marshall imposed judicial review
on his country by an act of usurpation in Marbury v. Madison.2s The
truth, as usual, is less dramatic. A number of states were familiar with
the practice, and at least some delegates at the convention of 1787
expected judges to enforce the Constitution over enacted law. 29
Hamilton, in Federalist No. 78,10 laid out the reasoning that Marshall
followed fifteen years later in Marbury. Jefferson, who turned out to
be no admirer of judges, wrote Madiion from Paris in 1789 that
one good reason for adding a Bill of Rights to the new Constitution
was "the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary."'"
So there was certainly some expectation that courts would measure the
26. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 248 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner
eds. 1966).
28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
29. See H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 9-11 (1973).
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 6, at 482-91.
31. 14 Tim PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
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actions of government against the Constitution, treating the latter as
higher law. But surely no one then imagined the extent of the power
that would be exercised by judges or the degree of our reliance on the
practice.
The importance of judicial review as it has developed can be
illustrated by one great case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

Sawyer.3 2 In 1952, President Truman, facing a crippling steel strike
during the Korean War, ordered his Secretary of Commerce, Charles
Sawyer, to seize and operate the steel mills. The companies sued, and
a majority of the Supreme Court held the president's action invalid
because he had exceeded his powers. What is so interesting about the
decision is that it was based not on any of the specific- guarantees in
the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of speech or press or religion, but
on the structural doctrines of the original Constitution. As some of the
justices saw it, President Truman had violated the separation of powers;
he had tried to exercise legislative power, Justice Black said. 3 Others
saw it as a question of authority and found that the president had exercised more power than could reasonably be inferred from any statute
or even from silent acquiescence by Congress. Congress had spoken in
the labor field, and it had not approved seizure powers.34 Justice Frankfurter warned that the founders of our country "had no illusion that our
people enjoyed biological or psychological or sociological immunities
from the hazards of concentrated power. 31 5 "Today," Justice Douglas
said, "a kindly President uses the seizure power to effect a wage
increase and to keep the steel furnaces in production."38 But tomorrow
another president might use it for other purposes.
The marvelous thing about Supreme Court decisions is that the
principles established in one case may be applied in another to utterly
different facts. The Steel Seizure Case, when it was decided, was
regarded by some as a victory for conservative property interests. But
twenty years later its principle, that a president must point to specific
authority in law for his exercise of power, was an important factor in
the Supreme Court's refusal to enjoin newspaper publication of the
Pentagon Papers"--an action for which there would have been no
32. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
33. Id. at 587-88.
34. Id. at 603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring).
37. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See especially
the concurring opinions of Justice Douglas, id. at 720; Justice White, id. at 730, 740;
and Justice Marshall, id. at 740, 742.
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statutory basis. And the Steel Seizure Case played a part in the
willingness of the courts to join issue with President Nixon over the
White House tapes, and in the ultimate rejection of his claim that presi8
dents are immune from judicial process.1
Courts in our system have power so great that it is a proper subject
for our concern. Judges, like others, can abuse their authority. And
it can be unhealthy-undemocratic, as Justice Frankfurter used to
warn3 -when those frustrated by the political process go to the courts
for needed social reforms. Against those concerns must be weighed
the real benefits from the process of constitutional adjudication. The
Supreme Court provides a reassuringly open forum, less moved by
money or position than any other institution of government. Moreover,
it is concerned with principle. The other branches are entitled to act
on the basis of expediency, even without explanation. The Court must
give reasons for what it does-reasons that appeal to the intellect and
the ethical sense of the country. The Court introduces a moral element
into our political life. It listens to the despised and the rejectedminorities, the politically unorthodox, prisoners-when no one else
will.
Other free countries depend on unwritten understandings to avoid
abuse of official power. The example always given is Britain, where
judges must enforce as law whatever Parliament enacts and where very
large and undefined power is delegated to the prime minister as executive. Once, when I lived in England, I complained to a friend about
a law that seemed to me grossly arbitrary. He replied: "You don't
understand. You Americans take pride in being a country of laws, not
men. This is a country of men, not laws." In short, the British rely
on a tradition of decency in public service. But even the British are
not so sure any longer that tradition is enough of a safeguard; there
is talk of bringing in some kind of entrenched bill of rights.40
Given the volume of official brutality in the world today, it is not
surprising that people elsewhere should look with envy at the independent power of American courts to protect basic human rights. The
feeling struck me with particular force on a recent visit to South Africa,
a country where the official mechanisms of inhumanity have been constructed with a devilish ingenuity.41 In a way, the worst thing about
South Africa, to an American visitor, is the subservience of law to the
38. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
39. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40. See M. ZANDm, A BILL OF RIoTs? (1975).
41. See van Niekerk, The Mirage of Liberty, 3 HuMAx RiGHs 283 (Fall 1973).
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cruelest policies of the state. There are superb and courageous
lawyers, but they operate within a system where judges carry out the
most draconian statutes, where it is -the law that blacks shall have
sep.rate and unequal public facilities, 42 where the law labels dissent
"terrorism." 4 3
In any event, whatever the merits or drawbacks of judicial review,
we are stuck with our reliance on law and the courts. It is too late
to change. No one would seriously suggest now that we could safely
depend on the humanity and restraint of presidents or congressmen or
state legislators or prosecutors. And the habit of mind is too deep;
without even knowing that we are doing so, Americans think politically
in terms of legal assumptions. That sometimes makes us hard for
others to understand. Watergate, for example, mystified sophisticated
French and English editors. Not appreciating the importance of law
in the American psyche, they were bewildered at the fuss made over
what seemed to them rather ordinary illegality. The force of the legal
tradition was especially striking when President Nixon dismissed the
Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox. In Europe an executive would
surely be free to dismiss someone he had appointed to such an office.
But here there is doctrine-developed by the Supreme Court from the
whole American view of authority-that rulers are bound by the rules
they themselves make unless and until the rules are lawfully changed. 4 4
There had been a formal undertaking, backed by rules, to have an
independent prosecutor. The violation of those rules contributed to
the extraordinary public protest when Mr. Cox was fired-protest that
created the conditions for the eventual fall of the president.
But the American reliance on law and institutional structures to
maintain our liberties carries with it a considerable risk: If law fails,
if institutions are distorted, then the United States may be left vulnerable, more vulnerable than a society like Britain's that looks to tradition for safety. Watergate is what comes to mind. We congratulated
ourselves when it was over, but we also had a prickly feeling of having come close to a corruption of institutions that would not have been
easy to undo. But Watergate was the signal of a more profound distortion in the constitutional structure-the lopsided growth of presidential power.
42. R_SRVATON OF SEP'mrE AMENnTmS ACT, Act No. 49, S. AFR. STAT. 328

(1953).
43. TERISosM ACT, Act No. 83, S. APR. STAT. 1236 (1967).

44. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974), citing United
States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), and Service v. Dulles, 354
U.S. 363 (1957).
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What has happened to the presidency in this century shows that
even the authors of The Federalistlacked perfect insight. In a republican government, Madison said, the legislative branch "necessarily predominates, " 4 1 and must be watched for its encroachments. The executive was safer, "being restrained within a narrower compass and being
more simple in its nature."46 Hamilton saw "a moral certainty, that the
office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not
in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications," and
a "constant probability" of presidents "preeminent for ability and
virtue. ' 47 He must have been reading Theodore White."
In the last forty years the power of the presidency, if not the virtue of its occupants, has grown beyond the imagination of the framers.
The reasons are evident. Presidents were usually creatures of modest
authority so long as most problems and most responsibility in this
country remained local in character. But since 1933 the American
economy has been nationalized. The public looks to Washington for
the fundamental economic and social decisions: on prices, interest
rates, unemployment, food supplies, welfare arrangements, and an endless number of other matters. Inevitably, people look to the president,
the one most visible figure. Similarly, in foreign affairs the pressure
is always for presidential action. Cultural and technological change
work the same way. When millions move their homes every year,
there is less allegiance to states and regions. As political parties and
our old intimate social institutions decay, Americans turn to the president for reassurance, for a symbol of community.49
One is reminded of that moving passage in Shakespeare's Henry
the Fifth when the King, walking alone in the English camp the night
before Agincourt, reflects unhappily that in his soldiers' thoughts he
bears their burdens: "Upon the King! Let us our lives, our souls, our
debts, our careful wives, our children and our sins, lay on the King!""
It would take a person of exceptional modesty and clarity of vision
to resist the corrupting effects of such attention, and we have been in
45. Tun FEDERALIST No. 51, supranote 6, at 324.
46. Id., No. 48, at 310.
47. Id., No. 69, at 426-27.
48. T. WmTE, BREAcH OF Farr (1975). For a critical review, see Lewis, A Case
of Mistaken Identity, NEw YORKER, Aug. 11, 1975, at 81.
49. See Cramton, Lessons of Watergate, ITHACA JoURNAL, Oct. 17, 1974, at 13, col.
3. ("The President . . . is the one official who is sufficiently visible and universal to
attract constant attention . . . and to serve as an emblem of our diminishing sense of
community.")
50. W. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY Tm Fom, Act IV, scene 1, line 230.
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rather short supply of such presidents lately. Two recent presidents
were so weak in ego, or character, that they miniicked the style of a
monarch. Mr. Nixon dressed the White House guards in chocolatesoldier suits until laughter exploded that pretension. He used to refer
to himself in the third person or with the royal "we." ("Let others
wallow in Watergate, we are going to do our job." 51) Mr. Johnson,
we have learned lately, actually walked down the aisle of Air Force
One one night shouting, "I am the king." His press secretary followed,
saying that was off the record.52
A single example suffices to indicate how presidential power has
slipped away from the conception of the framers. In 1973, after the
Paris agreement had ended direct American military action in Vietnam,
American aircraft were shifted at President Nixon's direction to bomb
Cambodia. There was no authority for such a war on Cambodia in any
statute, resolution, or treaty. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution,53 which had
offered a form of justification for American action in Vietnam, had
been repealed.5 4 There were no American troops to protect. The only
attempt at a legal justification was offered by the Secretary of Defense,
Elliot Richardson. He said that the Cambodian government had asked
us to bomb, a fact that could hardly add to the constitutional power of
an American president."
Then came what may have been the most brazen attempt by any
president to exceed the bounds of the Constitution. Congress passed
a bill forbidding all United States military action in or over Indochina.
Mr. Nixon vetoed the bill, 6 and claimed the authority to go right on
bombing, as he did. He thus assumed the power to wage a war not only
in the absence of congressional approval but in the face of express disapproval. It was as if the Constitution had been amended by presidential fiat to read: "The President shall have the power to wage war
unless the Congress, by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, shall order
him to desist." That particular issue was resolved when a compromise
applied at a later date the prohibition on bombing or other military
action in Indochina.17 But I wonder whether that compromise miti51. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1973, at 7, col. 5.
52. H. THoMAs, DATELmNE: WHITE HOUSE 52 (1975).
53. Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
54. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055.
55. 119 CONG. REc. 16,142 (daily ed. May 17, 1973).
56. 119 CONG. REc. 5486 (daily ed. June 27, 1973).
57. Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-50, tit. Im, § 307, 87 Stat. 99, 129. The
section reads: "None of the funds herein appropriated under this Act may be expended
to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North
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gated the damage to the Constitution. In the spring of 1975 another
president bombed Cambodia in retaliation for seizure of an American
merchant ship. The law prohibiting the use of such force in Indochina
was still on the books, but hardly any member of Congress or of the
press mentioned it in discussing the Mayaguez episode. 8 , I fear that
the habit of shrugging at presidential lawlessness in foreign and military
affairs will be hard to break.
The Cambodian episode shows how much we depend on courts
to hold us to our principles. The bombing seemed to many flagrantly
lawless, perhaps more so than President Truman's steel seizure, but a
lawsuit to stop it failed because of traditional judicial reluctance to
review anything labeled foreign affairs.59 It often seems puzzling that
a country as devoted to civil liberties at home as the United States
can be so involved in inhumanities abroad as the recent record indicates. One reason must be that in foreign matters the courts do not
perform their vital function of illuminating the ethical implications of
policy.
One other factor in foreign affairs should be mentioned: the
greater tendency to do business in secret. Just as this country is more
vulnerable to a failure of law or institutions because it relies on them,
so I think it is especially vulnerable to the corrupting effects of official
secrecy. Comparison with Britain may again be helpful. In a country
still governed in good part by an old boy network, where certain
things are just not done, secrecy need not nurture abuse of power,
although even in England there is growing awareness of danger in
secrecy.60 The United States has no old boy network, no morality of
the playing fields. Accountability in our system depends, as so much
does, on more formal institutions. Discipline in the London stock
exchange is applied by the club itself, ours by a federal commissionand one to which the law requires disclosure. We depend not only
on law but on openness. With us, it might be said, there can be no
accountability in the dark.
The history of the last dozen years is littered with the terrible
Vietnam and South Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and
South Vietnam by United States forces, and after Aug. 15, 1973, no other funds heretofore appropriated under any other Act may be expended for such purpose."
58. Even newspapers that had long been critical of the Indochina war suspended
their disbelief at the time of the Mayaguez episode. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 15,
1975, at 42, col. 1 (city ed.).
59. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
60. See H. EvANs, Tim FREEuoM oF THE PiRsss (1974).
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results of secrecy. One need mention only Vietnam, the war that
America entered by stealth and waged by methods that it concealed
from itself. The crimes plotted by the Central Intelligence Agency 6'
could only have been nurtured in secrecy; the plans would have
withered in shame if exposed to public knowledge. On the domestic
side, secrecy was a predicate of the whole collection of abuses called
Watergate. Secrecy allowed our most powerful police agency to be
headed by a man of whom it would be a kindness to say that he suffered
from senile paranoia, 62 a man who used his power to try to destroy lawabiding, even noble citizens of whose ideas he disapproved.
The worst danger of secrecy is that, like lawlessness, it becomes
a habit. A pending lawsuit seeks to obtain from the National Security
Council the titles of some old study memoranda. The council secretary, Jeanne W. Davis, filed an affidavit opposing the request. Even
the knowledge that the government had studied certain issues years
ago, she said, could arouse "special-interest groups in the United States
[to] mount a lobbying effort. . . . This could interfere seriously with
the objective, dispassionate atmosphere in which these issues are
analyzed. . . ."I' In other words, it would be inconvenient to have
citizens express a view in public on public issues, even those decided
years ago. That in a country with the First Amendment!
But the most insidious effects of secrecy may be on the attitudes
of the people. They may, indeed some of them do, come to accept
that they should be excluded from a large part of the business of
government, a profoundly subversive thought in a system of selfgovernment. Consider two earlier episodes in Cambodia: the secret
bombing carried on by President Nixon for more than a year without
the knowledge of Congress or even the Secretary of the Air Force,
using funds appropriated for aid to Greece and Turkey, and then his
sudden and private decision to invade Cambodia. When these acts
were criticized in a newspaper, a New York doctor wrote a letter
asking, "Since when does the President of the U.S. have to have public discussion when he considers it necessary to bomb or send troops
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into a country?" One wonders how such a question would have struck
the men who risked their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor
to make a revolution against George the Third, demanding government
with the consent of the governed.
Since 1776 the conditions of life have been transformed, but the
meaning of that transformation for our experiment in freedom is not
necessarily encouraging. What an Oxford don, Alan Ryan, wrote
recently of liberty in his country has meaning for ours. By old standards, he said, "we have surely conquered scarcity," but we feel worse
off. "Our knowledge of the natural order, and our controls over it,
are quite extraordinary"; but far from making us "feel more like free
and rational beings," it makes us "aware of a humiliating dependence
on experts . . . and in all too many cases resentful of logic, let alone
science." We may have reduced political arbitrariness, "but we have
locked ourselves in an iron bureaucratic cage." 6
We live in an age of juggernauts, of scientific and industrial and
military powers so huge and so remote that we wonder whether any
government can control them. We have begun to worry about destruction of the life-sustaining environment. We fear atomization in politics
and loneliness in private life. In society we sense dangerous divisions
-dangerous because those excluded from the benefits of civilization
on account of race or poverty are not likely to have much stake in civilized behavior. And as the problems grow larger, the political leaders
seem to grow smaller. Or is that only an optical illusion?
In America there is a sense that government grows and expectations of it increase, just as its authority diminishes. The same may be
said of society as a whole. We talk about egalitarianism, but we
achieve it only with a general cheapening of cultural values; the
economic gap grows, between rich and poor countries and individuals.
We are far from the optimism of the eighteenth century, or from the
unified vision that Americans had then. It is touching, because it is
so remote from our experience, to read John Jay's statement that
"providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one
united people-a people descended from the same ancestors. .. .
The diversity of our origins today does not make us any less American.
But with all the centralization of life, the speed of communication, and
the ease of travel, we are less connected as a people.
Perhaps most troubling of all, as we celebrate the birth of our
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country's liberties, are signs that Americans are straying from the truth
written into our fundamental law in 1787-that the only way to
preserve the end of liberty is to concern ourselves with the means of
political society. Lately we have too often seemed impatient of following the rules, of paying attention to means. We have even, some of
us, adopted the doctrine that Brandeis rightly said would "bring terrible
retribution": 68 that the end justifies the means.
These disturbing signs are not limited to one party or ideology;
they cover the political spectrum. Liberals encouraged presidents
to make executive agreements instead of treaties, to take warlike
actions without a declaration of war, to use executive orders on
domestic social issues when legislation presented difficulties.6 7 Conservatives were prepared to jettison law and the Constitution itself in
the name of fighting subversion or the world communist conspiracy.68
A committee that advised President Eisenhower in 1954 on covert
activities said it might be necessary to use tactics "more ruthless than
that employed by the enemy. . . . Hitherto acceptable norms of
human conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, longstanding
American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered." 9
When the Senate report on C.I.A. assassination plots was published,
Spiro Agnew said the C.I.A. should keep the option of assassination.
He added, "It's typical of Americans to expect themselves to abide by
70
the rules while others don't.1
Yes, it is typical, and it is precisely what the founders of the United
States had in mind. They thought the liberty of Americans depended
on following the rules no matter what others did. They lived in a time
of dangers acutely perceived, but that did not lead them to say that the
end justified the means. They did not limit the powers of government
except during Indian wars. They did not guarantee free speech unless the
British burned the White House. They gambled instead on following
the rules, whether convenient or not.
Our question is whether the ideals of the eighteenth century fit
the crude realities of the twentieth. Can there really still be safety in
the vision of Jefferson and Madison, of free men delegating the most
limited powers to those who govern in their name? Or is that an
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Arcadian fantasy unsuited to life in a disorderly country, on a bristling
planet? Well, if I thought the vision of 1776 and 1787 had become
outmoded, I would probably not be here. I think that vision is more
meaningful, more important now than ever.
Just think what has happened to this country in the last dozen
years. The assassination of a president did grievous damage to our
confidence. The two presidents who followed had faults of character
so grave that they went to the edge of destroying our sense of political
legitimacy. A terrible war sapped belief in our own values. A criminal conspiracy operated at the top of our political system.
Not many countries could go through all that and emerge as intact
as the United States did. There is hardly ground for smugness in that
record; the poison of doubt introduced into our national life by Vietnam
and Watergate will be with us for a long time. But there is reason
for pride in our institutions. We survived because of laws, not men;
because of the formal structures created in 1787, and the commitment
to their enforcement by law. Even Richard Nixon felt obliged to bow,
in the end, to law: to the Supreme Court, the branch of government
that The Federalist said would be 'beyond comparison the weakest of
the three," having "neither force nor will, but merely judgment."'" In
the tradition we have forged, judgment was enough.
Regretfully, too few Americans prize as they should our history's
one incontestably great achievement, which is constitutionalism. Recently a most sophisticated student of social thought, Daniel Bell of
Harvard, looked at the decline of American illusions and wrote: "Of
all the gifts bestowed on this country at its founding the one that alone
remains as the element of American exceptionalism is the constitutional
system. '72 But in our distraction, our zeal for getting and spending,
we forget the essential values of our political society. Or worse yet,
we are ready to trade them for promises of instant gratification.
We need more faith in self-government, not less; more openness,
not more secrets; a deeper commitment to law, not new ways of avoiding its inconveniences. Like human beings generally, we yearn for
order. But experience has added weight to the framers' teaching that
it must be an order made tolerable by reason and humanity.
When he was 83, Jefferson was invited to Washington for
the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence: July 4,
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1826. He replied that he was too ill to make the journey, but he
offered this still vigorous and confident thought:
The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to
every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind was not
born with saddles on their backs for a favored few booted 73and
spurred, ready to ride them legitimately by the grace of God.
On the morning of that July 4, Jefferson died at Monticello. A
few hours later in Quincy, Massachusetts, his political rival and great
friend, John Adams, died. Adams' last words were, "Jefferson still
lives. ' 174 As the man who promised life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness to those who would fight for ideals, I believe he does.
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